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Based on China’s unique institutional settings and concentrated ownership 
structure, this paper systematically studies the controlling shareholders’ 
decision-making, motivation of rights issues and related implicit motivation of 
earnings management by using the model of Myers and Majluf(1984). Theoretical 
analysis indicates there are three motivations of rights issues: timing-expropriation, 
unconditional expropriation and investing good project. According to different 
motivations of rights issues, the paper distinguishes between different pre-issue 
implicit motivations of earnings management. Implicit motivation embodies ultimate 
aim of rights issuing. So if controlling shareholders conduct rights issuing aiming for 
expropriation, the implicit motivation of earnings management is opportunistic; but if 
aiming for good investment project, the implicit motivation is non-opportunistic. Most 
of existing studies analyze earnings management from the perspective of 
opportunistic motivation, and consider pre-issue earnings management as 
opportunistic behavior which management or controlling shareholders maximize their 
own interests at the expenses of the interests of the firm and other stakeholders. 
However, the research on the motivation of rights issues suggests that there are also 
non-opportunistic implicit motivations of pre-issue earnings management, including 
efficient contracting and information-delivering motivations. 
This paper selects China’s listed companies which conduct rights issuing during 
the period 2001-2009 as samples. Combing the firm’s operating performance, the 
paper empirically analyzes and tests the controlling shareholders’ motivation of rights 
issues and their related implicit motivation of earnings management from the 
following three aspects: the controlling shareholders’ subscription degree, the 
difference between the pre-issue’s and post-issue’s ownership proportion and the use 
of raised fund. 
The study of rights issues’ motivation finds: 1.The fewer the controlling 
shareholders subscribe stocks, the higher issuing price they will set, and more 















issuing firms which change fund using direction deteriorates significantly after the 
offering. The results indicate the reason of changing is more related to controlling 
shareholders’ expropriation, and expropriation is still main motivation of rights issues, 
and also the primary cause of the post-issue underperformance. 2. The research on the 
motivation of rights issues combining related corporate operating performance points 
out, the samples which abandon all subscription rights or change fund using direction 
are more likely have motivation of timing-expropriation or unconditional 
expropriation. And the motivation of investing good project mainly exists in those 
samples which do not abandon all subscription rights and do not change the use of 
fund. The paper also finds that the samples which do not abandon all subscription 
rights and meanwhile change fund using direction may be propping companies first, 
and then tunneling them. 
This paper also empirically tests the implicit motivation of earnings management 
behind the motivation of rights issues. According to different motivations of rights 
issues, the implicit motivation of earnings management can be divided into two 
categories: opportunistic motivation and non-opportunistic motivation. This paper 
finds that earning management with opportunistic motivation has significant negative 
effects on future performance. So it is another important reason for post-issue 
underperformance. But non-opportunistic motivation can help increase the future 
development of issuing firms. 
To sum up, this study shows the post-issue underperformance is due to controlling 
shareholders’ opportunistic behavior which stems from the conflicts of interests 
between the principal and agent under concentrated ownership structure. The 
opportunistic behaviors around SEO include pre-issue opportunistic earnings 
management and post-issue expropriation. However the non-opportunistic behaviors 
of controlling shareholders, including pre-issue non-opportunistic earnings 
management and post-issue good investment, will not lead to subsequent 
underperformance, on the opposite, will promote future performance growing fast. 
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行 SEO 的上市公司，其 SEO 后的股票市场回报以及经营业绩均出现了下滑
（Loughran和 Ritter，1995，1997），这一现象也被称为“SEO后的业绩下降之










1．我国上市公司是否也存在 SEO后的业绩下降现象。自从 Loughran和 Ritter


























和宋衍蘅（2003）、Chen和 Yuan（2004）、Haw et al.（2005）、Yu et al.（2006）、



















































能产生侵害小股东利益和公司价值的“隧道效应”（Johnson et al.，2000；La Porta 
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